Stable and variable affordances are both automatic and flexible by Anna M. Borghi & Lucia Riggio
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 19 June 2015
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00351
Stable and variable affordances are
both automatic and flexible
Anna M. Borghi 1* and Lucia Riggio 2
1 Department of Psychology, University of Bologna and Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National
Research Council, Rome, Italy, 2 Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Parma, Italy
Edited by:
Agustin Ibanez,
Institute of Cognitive Neurology,
Argentina
Reviewed by:
Costantini Marcello,
University of Chieti, Italy
Mariella Pazzaglia,
University of Rome “La Sapienza”,
Italy
*Correspondence:
Anna M. Borghi,
Department of Psychology, University
of Bologna and Institute of Cognitive
Sciences and Technologies, Italian
National Research Council, Viale Berti
Pichat 5, Bologna 40127, Italy
anna.borghi@gmail.com
Received: 23 March 2015
Accepted: 01 June 2015
Published: 19 June 2015
Citation:
Borghi AM and Riggio L (2015)
Stable and variable affordances are
both automatic and flexible.
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:351.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00351
The mere observation of pictures or words referring to manipulable objects is sufficient to
evoke their affordances since objects and their nouns elicit components of appropriate
motor programs associated with object interaction. While nobody doubts that objects
actually evoke motor information, the degree of automaticity of this activation has been
recently disputed. Recent evidence has indeed revealed that affordances activation
is flexibly modulated by the task and by the physical and social context. It is
therefore crucial to understand whether these results challenge previous evidence
showing that motor information is activated independently from the task. The context
and the task can indeed act as an early or late filter. We will review recent data
consistent with the notion that objects automatically elicit multiple affordances and
that top-down processes select among them probably inhibiting motor information
that is not consistent with behavior goals. We will therefore argue that automaticity
and flexibility of affordances are not in conflict. We will also discuss how language
can incorporate affordances showing similarities, but also differences, between the
motor information elicited by vision and language. Finally we will show how the
distinction between stable and variable affordances can accommodate all these
effects.
Keywords: affordances, language comprehension, canonical neurons, mirror neurons, automaticity, grasping,
embodied cognition, tools
Introduction
The study of affordances (Gibson, 1979), i.e., of the invitations to act objects offer to us, is
becoming increasingly popular in the last years (for a review, Thill et al., 2013), also due to the
increasing spread of embodied and grounded cognition views, according to which there is a strict
interaction between perception, action, and cognition. The aim of this paper is to propose a novel
view on affordances, which considers the way in which they are represented and vary depending
on the context and the task, based on recent evidence obtained in our labs and in other labs.
The paper is organized in two main sections.
In the first section we will claim that different kinds of affordances exist, i.e., stable and
variable ones. Both stable and variable affordances are flexible, but to a different extent. We will
also consider how these affordances are modulated and constrained by language.
In the second section we will discuss whether affordances are always automatically activated
or whether they are contextual dependent. Finally, we will consider some cases in which we might
need to ‘‘block’’ affordance activation: the activation of multiple affordances, of broken affordances,
and of affordances of dangerous objects.
Overall, we will defend a view according to which automaticity and flexibility are not in conflict.
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Stable and Variable Affordances
The notion of affordance, proposed by Gibson in 1979, has
received a lot of interest in the last 15 years. In the ecological
perspective adopted by Gibson, affordances consists in the
invitation to action offered by the environment to living
organisms. Gibson’s theory of affordances is directly related to
his overall view of direct perception. According to him, given
that our species has evolved in a given ecological niche, the
environment directly offers to us the possibility to perceive
it correctly, without the mediation of mental representations.
Affordances are perceived in a direct way: we do not need
to activate objects knowledge to perceive their affordances.
Importantly, according to Gisbon affordances are not properties
of objects alone but they are relational, since they concern both
the organism and the environment, both the subject and the
object.
Given that affordances involve both perception and action,
it is not surprising that this notion has had a lot of success
within embodied and grounded views. However, depending on
whether a more or less radical embodied perspective is adopted,
this notion has been differently interpreted. While Gibson’s
perspective is fully externalist and anti-representational (see also
Chemero, 2009), recent authors contributing to the spread of
the notion of affordances in psychology and neuroscience have
considered affordances as the product of the conjunction, in the
brain, of visual and motor experiences (Ellis and Tucker, 2000).
We share this second perspective. This perspective has in our
view two important implications. First, it implies that affordances
are flexible and continuosly modified and updated thanks to
novel experiences. In this respect, there is no discontinuity with
Gibson’s view. Second, it ascribes relevance to the interactions
between the environment and the organisms as a whole, taking
into account not only the dynamics of these interactions but
also their neural representation: in this respect, this view departs
from Gibson’s externalist view, as a famous quote clarifies: ‘‘Ask
not what’s inside your head, but what your head’s inside of.’’
Adopting this second view has led to an increased interest
for the neural representation of affordances and has produced
impressive behavioral and neural results in the last years.
In order to emphasize both the similarities and the differences
between their perspective and Gibson’s view, Ellis and Tucker
(2000) have proposed to use the term microaffordance. For
research reason, we find the inspiration leading to the proposal
of microaffordance highly useful. In fact, in order to understand
the processes that are going on during object processing it is
very useful to refer to specific action components, as reaching
and grasping; the importance of these specific action components
is captured in the proposal to use the term micro-affordances
(see also Masson et al., 2011). In the following pages we will
however stick to the term affordance, since we think it is a good
umbrella term, but we will try to formulate a theoretical proposal
that takes into account specific action components related to the
interaction with specific objects.
We propose (see also Borghi and Riggio, 2009) that, when
specific action components are considered, affordances can be
distinguished into stable and variable.
We consider stable affordances to derive from rather stable
or invariant features or properties of objects, and from their
relationship with organisms who interact with them. Imagine
for example listening to somebody telling you ‘‘Bring here some
fruit’’ or imagine seeing some fruits at a distance. For grasping
affordances of fruit the property of size and the grasping action
it evokes is rather stable: we may indeed prepare ourselves to
interact with cherries using a precision grip, and with apples
with a power grip, assuming that these fruits are within our
reaching distance. Obviously the size of cherries (or apples) has
a certain degree of variability: not all cherries have the same size,
but we typically grasp all cherries with a precision rather than
with a power grip. The associations between the visual aspects
of cherries and apples and the motor response they produce can
be incorporated into an object representation, stored in memory
(e.g., we ‘‘know’’ that cherries are graspable with a precision
grip).
Canonical affordances can be considered as a subset of stable
affordances, characterized by a lower degree of stability and
higher contextual dependence than purely stable affordances.
They derive from properties that vary with respect to the
interaction with us, such as orientation, but that can become
more stable across multiple experiences. For example, we might
consider cherries as having a canonical orientation: they are
hardly grasped with the petiole on the lower side, since we
typically pick them up from trees, from containers or from
plain surfaces, and in all these cases they have the petiole
on the upper side. A similar but slightly more complex case
is given by cups. The complexity is due to the fact that,
differently from natural objects, artifacts typically evoke both
manipulative/grasping actions and actions related to object’s use,
i.e., they evoke two kinds of actions that do not necessarily
coincide (Jax and Buxbaum, 2010). The way we use the term
manipulation probably requires some clarification, since this
term has been used as well to refer to haptic exploration of
objects not guided by a specific goal (Menz et al., 2010). We use
this term to refer to the hand posture and grip which are not
aimed at using a given object but simply at interacting with it,
for example to move it. We propose that canonical affordances
are linked to the actions we more typically perform with objects,
to the most frequent contexts in which they are embedded and
to the most frequent goals with which we approach them. In
the case of artifacts these actions, contexts and goals are usually
related to their use. Even if we interact with cups in different
orientations—for example when we wash them, move them, etc.,
when we grasp cups to use them, they typically have a specific
orientation: they are upright, since we have to hold them to
drink the liquid they contain. Due to the higher frequency of this
upright orientation when we use cups, it might be useful to store
information on cups’ canonical orientation.
Referring to the context can help us to further clarify
why canonical affordances can be seen as a subset of stable
affordances, characterized by a lower degree of stability and
a higher degree of contextual dependency. Stable affordances
related to intrinsic properties of objects (Jeannerod et al., 1995),
such as those emerging from object size, vary less across contexts
and goals. For example, we typically grasp cherries and pencils
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with a precision grip, independently from the context, for the
very simple fact that their dimension affords a precision grip.
Canonical affordances, such as canonical orientation, are instead
selected by the context. For example, the orientation of a knife
for using it in order to cut something and for handling it to
somebody else typically differs.
Differently from stable affordances, we consider variable
affordances to derive, instead, from rather temporary object
characteristics. Furthermore, variable affordances are strictly
linked to the actions we are about to perform. Take the following
example concerning object location: the location of cherries may
vary—they can be on a tree, on a table, and their petiole might
be upright but more or less inclined, thus we may need to adapt
online our motor responses to the current location of the cherry
we intend to grasp. Given the variability of this information, it
wouldn’t make sense to store in memory information on it.
Notice that the term ‘‘stable’’ should not be misleading: we
do not see any incompatibility between the use of this term
and the idea that affordances are processed and responded to
online, thus that they might need a certain degree of adjustment
of the organism in relationship to objects (see objections by
Osiurak, 2013). At the same time, some stable parameters
are needed to program actions, in particular if we have to
program them offline, without having an object or an entity
in front of us. This happens, for example, when someone tells
us ‘‘Grasp the cherry’’ or ‘‘Lift the hammer’’ before we have
seen or recognized the object we have to interact with. This
stability is more the result of a dynamical process than of
an a priori determination; furthermore, it is not given but
it is subject to continuous updating. It could be argued that
what we call ‘‘stable’’ affordances are not real affordances but
rather consists in simple knowledge of the object. We do not
think this is the case, because not only variable but also stable
affordances dynamically evoke motor responses. Hence, given
that in our view stable and variable affordances are arranged
along a continuum, one could speak of ‘‘more’’ stable and ‘‘more’’
variable affordances.
As to their brain localization, some years ago Borghi and
Riggio (2009) proposed that stable affordances are represented
more ventrally compared to variable ones (see also Young,
2006). In particular, the bipartition of the dorsal stream
into a dorso-dorsal and a dorso-ventral system, introduced
by Rizzolatti and Matelli (2003), is crucial to capture how
these two kinds of affordances are represented in the brain.
According to them, the dorso-dorsal stream, corresponding
to the dorsal stream as originally defined by Milner and
Goodale (Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and Goodale,
1995) and contrasted with the ventral stream, is the only
stream not related to perception and would be dedicated to
the online control of action. The ventro-dorsal stream, instead,
would be specifically involved in sensorimotor transformation
for grasping, space perception and recognition of actions
performed by others (see Gallese, 2007; Binkofski and Buxbaum,
2013; Maranesi et al., 2014). Notice however that these
two streams are strictly interconnected and that all three
streams—dorso-dorsal, ventro-dorsal and ventral—finish into
cortical frontal areas.
A meta-analysis of fMRI studies (Sakreida et al., in
preparation) has confirmed that variable affordances are
represented more dorsally than stable ones, which are instead
represented in bilateral inferior parietal and premotor cortices
(dorso-dorsal vs. dorso-ventral stream), even if in the left
hemisphere there are overlap areas between the two. This
distinction is consistent with clinical observations. Optic ataxia
implies indeed impairments during visual reaching of objects,
which might be influenced by object orientation (variable
affordance). Limb apraxia can be instead characterized by
impairments in manipulation of objects, which might be related
to object size (stable affordance).
Results obtained with single cell recordings on monkeys
and brain imaging data with humans are also informative as
to the specific circuits likely involved during processing of
specific kinds of affordances (for a review, see Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Data on the monkey’s brain (Raos et al.,
2004, 2006) indicate that the visuomotor transformations for
grasping objects occur in the anterior intraparietal area (AIP)-
F5 circuit, which is devoted to select the most appropriate
motor schemas for the actions to be activated. Even if AIP-
F5 are better conceived of as a whole, neurons of F5 are
more motor and maintain memory of the object also in the
dark, while neurons of AIP are more visual and likely render
visual affordances available to the motor system. F5 canonical
neurons are differently activated depending on the kind of grip
objects require (e.g., precision, power) and are not influenced
by changing the position of the object in space (Jeannerod
et al., 1995). Recent evidence (Bonini et al., 2014) suggests that
they are however influenced by the position with respect to the
agent’s body, namely they are responsive only when the object
is in the peripersonal space. The role played by F5 neurons in
motor object representation is consistent with fMRI and PET
studies on humans showing that the ventral premotor cortex is
activated during observation and imagery of manipulable objects
and tools. For example, neuroimaging evidence has shown that
images of tools, but not of houses, animals, and faces, activated
the ventral premotor cortex (Grafton et al., 1997; Knight et al.,
1999; Chao and Martin, 2000), and that the ventral premotor
cortex was activated with manipulable objects but not with
not manipulable ones (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2002; Kellenbach
et al., 2003); the conjunct activation of the left posterior parietal
and left premotor cortices can be considered as the human
homolog of the canonical neuron system (see Martin, 2007, for
a review).
Overall, according to our proposal two ventro-dorsal circuits
concern more stable affordances in humans. The first is the
phAIP circuit (Orban and Caruana, 2014), which corresponds
in humans to the AIP-F5 circuit in monkeys. Both stable and
canonical affordances would be represented in this first circuit:
it has namely been shown that F5 neurons encode at the single
neuron level both the grip and the wrist rotation (Raos et al.,
2006). The second circuit, which is present only in humans,
would be located in anterior supramarginal gyrus (aSMG),
operates in parallel with phAIP and is specifically devoted to tool
use (see Orban and Caruana, 2014; on tool use see also Johnson-
Frey, 2004; Johnson-Frey et al., 2005).
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As to variable affordances, as anticipated we propose they
are represented more dorsally, in the dorso-dorsal stream of
the dorsal pathway (Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003). Considering
data on the monkey brain, an area candidate to the processing
of variable affordances is a third area where grasping neurons
are located, namely area F2 (corresponding in humans to the
dorsal PM cortex). This area, which receives visual input from
the superior parietal lobe and area medial superior temporal
(MST), encodes the orientation of the wrist for grasping the
object under visual guidance, continuously adjusting online the
grip to the object. Notice that the novelty of our proposal
does not consist in the anatomical identification of novel
neural circuits but rather in connecting these previously
identified circuits with the distinction between stable and
variable affordances, that hopefully will allow researchers to
link behavioral evidence on affordances with such neural
underpinnings.
Similarities and Differences from Other
Proposals
In the following section we will discuss the notion of
stable and variable affordances in the framework of similar
proposals advanced in the literature: the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic properties, originally proposed by
Jeannerod (1981, 1984; Jeannerod et al., 1995), the 2 Action
Systems (2AS) proposal (Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010)
and a recent proposal formulated by Orban and Caruana
(2014).
Jeannerod (1981, 1984) distinguished between intrinsic
object properties, such as size, shape and texture, which
are linked to grasping, and extrinsic properties, such
as distance and direction, related to object transport in
space, which determine the arm and hand position with
respect to the object. According to the visuomotor channels
hypothesis (Arbib, 1981; Jeannerod, 1981), the visuomotor
transformation related to object transportation and to object
grasping are namely independent. Different motor schemas
would be activated: a circuit pertaining the arm, devoted to
transportation, and another specifically focused on the hand,
linked to grasping, i.e., to the preshape of the hand while
approaching the object and to the enclosure of the hand on the
object.
A first difference between the distinction between stable and
variable affordances we propose and the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic object property is that according to our
proposal affordances cannot be assimilated to object properties.
Affordances are instead relational constructs, i.e., they refer
to brain representations of relationships between an organism
and one or more objects/entities within a social and physical
environment. As said, we agree with Ellis and Tucker (2000)
as they consider affordances are patterns of associations, in the
brain, of visual and motor experiences.
A second difference is that we do not distinguish between
stable affordances related to grasping and variable affordances
related to transport. As the examples above should clarify, stable
(including canonical) and variable object affordances can emerge
both during the transport and the grasping actions.
A further difference concerns the neural underpinnings:
the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is
indeed linked to the distinction between the grasping and the
transportation route (Jeannerod, 1994, 1997; Jeannerod et al.,
1995). We propose instead that the distinction between stable
and variable affordances is anchored to the difference, within
the dorsal route, between the ventro-dorsal and the dorso-dorsal
streams (Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003). The two routes identified
by Jeannerod and collaborators as dedicated to transport and
to grasping are both represented in the ventro-dorsal route,
which in our proposal is dedicated to stable and canonical
affordances. Variable affordances would be instead represented
in the dorso-dorsal route, mainly used for the online control of
actions.
Our view has some similarities with the (2AS) proposal
(e.g., Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010). The main tenet of this
proposal is that two different routes to action exist, the
Structure and the Function one. The Structure system is bilateral,
and it is specialized for visual information related to object
shape, size, and location, which is continuously updated. The
Function system is left-lateralized, and concerns more stable
conceptual knowledge: for example, this system extracts the
characteristics of a given action that remains constant over time,
such as the typical features characterizing grasping regardless
of the specific object to be grasped and of the kind of grip
which is used. These systems are not independent but highly
interactive and are likely mediated respectively by the dorso-
dorsal and by the ventro-dorsal route. According to the 2AS
view, artifact objects might evoke at the same time both
structural responses and functional ones (see also evidence
by Bub et al., 2008), and these actions might interfere. For
example, a knife might evoke both manipulation and functional
information: a kind of grip adequate to hold it to put it into
a drawer (structural response) and another adequate to use
it, for example cutting something (functional response). The
damage of one of the two systems can lead to impairment:
for example, apraxia of tool use would be due to impaired
manipulation (structural) knowledge. Jax and Buxbaum (2010)
have also demonstrated that the structural and functional
systems differ in activation and maintainance time: structural
responses are typically quicker than functional ones, but they
last less, whereas functional responses are slow and long
lasting.
One similarity between our view and the proposal by
Buxbaum and Kalenine (see also Binkofski and Buxbaum,
2013), is the assumption that observing a tool allows us to
extract information that differs in content and time course,
i.e., long term information such as that characterizing
stable affordances, and online information such as that
characterizing variable affordances. Another similarity is
that, in both cases, the dorso-dorsal and the ventro-dorsal
routes are the candidate areas for these representations.
However, in our view stable affordances are not necessarily
dedicated to functional information—for example, for natural
objects such as cherries or apples stable affordances can
concern the typical way in which we grasp and manipulate
them.
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Furthermore, while Buxbaum and collaborators stress the
potential interference arising between the two action systems,
and in particular between manipulation and function, we mainly
underline the different temporal and content characteristics of
stable and variable affordances. Stable and variable affordances
derive indeed from different object characteristics, some of which
are more keen to be maintained in long term memory compared
to others.
Finally, our proposal has some similarities with the view
by Orban and Caruana (2014) who propose that humans
have two different parietal circuits: the first, located in phAIP,
would be dedicated to grasping and manipulating all kinds
of objects; the second, located in the left aSMG, would be
specifically devoted to tool use and would be at the basis of
technological development in our species. Both would send
connections to the vPMC. Importantly, the parallel operation
of phAIP and aSMG is a further elaboration of the ventro-
dorsal stream (Rizzolatti and Matelli, 2003). According to Orban
and Caruana, affordances would refer only to the grasping
component, which is related not only to tools but to objects
as well, even if the aSMG can contribute in selecting the
affordances for phAIP, as demostrated by evidence with patients
with ideomotor apraxia. The phAIP component contributes
in planning appropriate grasping actions considering objects
size and shape, thus corresponding to the canonical neuron
systems in monkeys (F5 and AIP), i.e., to the ventro-dorsal
stream.
Our proposal is in line with Orban and Caruana’s one since
we do believe that it is important to distinguish between motor
information related to manipulation and to use, even if this
distinction is not at the core of our proposal, and the authors
identified two different neural circuits for grasping affordances
and tool use in humans. There is clear experimental behavioral
and neural evidence supporting the view that grasping and use
are different: for example, grasping the handle of an object to
use it is disrupted by a semantic task, but not by a visuospatial
one (Creem and Proffitt, 2001; see also Creem-Regehr and Lee,
2005). Despite some similarities the focus of our proposal, i.e., the
distinction between stable and variable affordances, is obviously
different from that of Orban and Caruana. Orban and Caruana
limit the use of the term affordances to the activation of object-
directed actions that take into account objects’ shape and size.
In this sense they adopt a strictly Gibsonian view, according to
which accessing to knowledge on the object is not necessary to
respond to object affordances. We use the term affordance both
to refer to grasping and to use (see Chaigneau et al., 2004, for
an integrative view of affordances, intentionality and function in
artifacts). The reason why we choose to use the term in both cases
is that in humans there are situations in which the distinction is
clear, but also many cases in which it is really hard to distinguish
between the two. Take for example a fork: to what extent is the
proficient use of a fork evoked by characteristics of the fork we
process online, to what extent is it due to long-term visuomotor
associations between the vision of that particular object and
the action of bringing something to the mouth, i.e., to its use?
Furthermore, limiting the use of the term affordances to online
grasping of objects would not allow us to speak of affordances
mediated by language. Given our use of the term affordances,
we do not like to claim that affordances are egocentric, as both
Orban and Caruana and as Osiurak (2013) seem to do: we
report below experimental evidence showing that affordances
are modulated by the context, for example that a pen affords
different actions when it is presented close to a sheet of paper
or to a stapler (Yoon et al., 2010; Borghi et al., 2012; Ellis et al.,
2013).
Stable and Variable Affordances and Language
So far we have illustrated the distinction between stable and
variable affordances. One important issue concerns how these
affordances are encoded in language (Kaschak and Glenberg,
2000). According to embodied theories of cognition, language
is grounded in perception, action and emotional systems (see
Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Barsalou, 2008; Pulvermüller and
Fadiga, 2010; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012; Meteyard et al., 2012;
see the recent special issues: Borghi and Pecher, 2011; Cappa and
Pulvermüller, 2012; Cangelosi and Borghi, 2014). Does this imply
that language mirrors exactly the processes and structures of the
motor system? We do not believe this is the case. Instead, in line
with theories of resuse (Gallese, 2008; Anderson, 2010), we think
that language recruits some mechanisms and processes of the
perception and motor system, but not necessarily all of them are
encoded (see Borghi, 2012, for a more detailed analysis). From
this general view the hypothesis follows, that language acts as a
sort of filter, encoding only certain kinds of affordances. We will
describe some recent studies to clarify our points.
In a behavioral study we asked participants to read a sentence
composed by an action vs. an observation verb followed by a
noun (e.g., grasp/look at the brush), then they were presented
with a photo of an object and had to decide whether the object
was the one mentioned in the sentence or not (Borghi and
Riggio, 2009). We found that during language processing a
motor prototype is formed. This prototype includes stable and
canonical affordances, related in this case to object size and
canonical orientation: they are indeed encoded in language, while
variable affordances are not (see Borghi, 2012, for theoretical
development of this issue, and Ferri et al., 2011b; Myachykov
et al., 2013, for further evidence). During real interaction with
objects the role played by affordances might differ, and in
particular the role played by stable affordances might be more
marginal, compared to what happens with language.
This hypothesis is supported by evidence by Ferri et al.
(2011b). The authors used 3D pictures of objects and asked
participants to perform precision or power grips to determine
their category (artifact vs. natural object); for artifacts they found
a compatibility effect between the grip used to respond and the
object size, but only when the objects were presented within
the reachable space. In a further experiment participants were
required to decide whether the 3D pictures corresponded to
previously presented names: in this case the compatibility effect
between the grip to respond and the object size was present,
but it was not modulated by the space. These data suggest that
objects and objects’ names have different motor representations:
while objects are characterized both by stable (i.e., shape and
size) and variable affordances (i.e., orientation and distance with
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respect to the perceiver), objects’ names seem to house only
stable ones.
Further support to the view that language encoded primarily
stable affordances comes from a recent study in which we
used mouse tracking to investigate the real-time dynamics of
compatibility effects (Flumini et al., 2014). We tracked the
time course of a categorization experiment requiring subjects
to categorize as natural or artifact pictures of big and small
objects. Participants responded using either a big mouse (hand
posture compatible with the grasping of big objects) or a small
mouse (requiring a precision grip: a hand posture compatible
with the grasping of small objects). We found a compatibility
effect between the grip required by the mouse and the grip
elicited by objects, even if it was irrelevant to the task. A
further experiment in which images were substituted by words
failed to reproduce the effects. The use of words in this
study (as in the previous one) allows to test three different
hypotheses, each leading to different predictions. According to
the first, words are represented in an abstract, propositional
and amodal way, thus no perceptual or motor effect should
be found with words. According to the second hypothesis,
derived from a purely embodied view, words are grounded in
the sensorimotor system, hence the same compatibility effect
found with images should be found with words. According to
the third hypothesis, derived from theories of reuse (Gallese,
2008; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009; Anderson, 2010), words
are grounded in perception and action systems, but language
processing differs to some extent from processing of objects,
hence the results with words should not necessarily mirror
those obtained with objects. Apparently at odd with a purely
embodied view, we did not find the compatibility effect
between the grip elicited by the mouse and the grip evoked
by the object with words. However, we found that while
using the small mouse, and thus performing a precision grip,
the processing of artificial small targets was inhibited and
the processing of natural small targets was facilitated. This
reveals that during language processing participants activated
information on the size of the word referent. When the object
was an artifact, it provoked an interference with the mouse
they held, otherwise a facilitation. The interference is likely
due to the fact that artifact words evoke use programs, which
are in conflict with the manipulation posture required by
the mouse. Such a conflict between manipulation and use
is not present with natural objects. This sensitivity to size
with linguistic stimuli is in keeping with our third hypothesis.
Indeed, it suggests that, since language is a rather sophisticated
ability, word processing might not reflect all the dynamics
characterizing processing of their referents, in line with theories
of reuse. Furthermore, it confirms that language recruits stable
affordances, such as size.
On Dynamic Aspects of Both Stable and Variable
Affordances: Some Responses to Osiurak
In a recent paper, Osiurak (2013) criticizes the proposal of
stable and variable affordances and proposes that apraxia
is not a matter of affordances. Responding to Osiurak’s
objections will allow us to better outline our points, in order
to avoid any misunderstanding, concerning some important
issues. First, we will clarify that the proposal of stable and
variable affordances was initially conceived in the context
of studies on language processing, and we will show the
consequences of this. Second, we will clarify that we are not
inclined to use the terms allocentric and egocentric to refer
to affordances. Third, we will address the relationship between
apraxia and affordances. Fourth, we will try to differentiate
between affordances and action goals. We will discuss these four
points below.
1. Osiurak (2013) criticizes our view arguing that no
affordances about the canonical manipulation of tools can be
stored, due to the dynamic character of action. We agree
with Osiurak that affordances are flexible and variable (We
address this issue more in depth at point 4). At the same
time, however, we believe that not only online information
but also previous experience play a major role in affordance
representation. The role of previous experience is particularly
important when we consider affordances as processed offline,
as it happens when they are mediated by words or by
images. The proposal of stable and variable affordances was
firstly advanced in such a context, while discussing the results
found by Borghi and Riggio (2009) (see above), showing that
during language comprehension we form a motor prototype
encoding stable and canonical affordances. Without encoding
some stable information no motor recruitment and linguistic
comprehension would be possible. At the same time, however,
accepting that some stable information must exist does not
imply at all denying the importance of the flexibility and
contextual dependence of affordances (Mizelle and Wheaton,
2010).
What happens with novel objects? To respond adequately
to their affordances we might rely on the context as support
(Pellicano et al., 2011). If the context is novel as well, we
would in any case need to rely on previous experiences with
objects endowed with similar affordances. Jacquet et al. (2012)
clearly showed the role of probabilistic cues related to previous
experience, together with that of biomechanical constraints, in
predicting interaction with novel objects under conditions of
visual uncertainty. Overall, we believe that it is difficult to think
of objects, entities and situations which are completely novel,
in which current experience cannot be traced back to similar
previous experiences.
2. Osiurak (2013) claims that manipulation knowledge and
stable affordances would be egocentric, since they specify the
relationship between the user and the tool. The problem, he
argues, is that patients need to form an allocentric representation
to solve mechanical problems. Differently from Osiurak, we
are not really keen to use the distinction between egocentric
and allocentric representation while referring to affordances
(see Osiurak, 2013). Rather, we prefer to see affordances as the
product of repeated experiences, with a given object or with
objects structurally similar to it. This experience is not necessarily
an individual experience, but we can benefit from others’
experience. We might observe other people interacting with an
object to ‘‘capture’’ the object’s affordance, or we might even
see an object or two objects interacting to simulate interaction
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with them. In this respect, recent evidence on canonical-
mirror neurons can be informative. Canonical neurons, which
are thought to be the neural underpinnings of affordances
(Murata et al., 1997), and mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996)
were typically considered as segregated: the first ones fire not
only when individuals interact directly with objects but also
when they observe manipulable objects and the second ones
during observation of others’ actions. Recent evidence challenges
this dychotomic view (Bonini et al., 2014), showing that
canonical-mirror neurons exist. Interestingly, while canonical
neurons do not code 90◦ rotated objects, canonical-mirror
neurons do. Furthermore, canonical neurons fire only when
objects are located in the peripersonal space, likely due to
the connections between area F5 and area F4 (Fogassi et al.,
1996; Matelli et al., 1996). Canonical-mirror neurons seem
instead to code object as target for both one’s own and other’s
action, thus they are not selective only to objects presented in
the peripersonal space (for consistent behavioral evidence, see
Costantini et al., 2011a,b). This suggests that they could play
a role in predicting others’ actions (for a review see Maranesi
et al., 2014). In sum, we do not think that affordances are
necessarily egocentric, because we can perceive also affordances
for others, as demonstrated by recent evidence. Furthermore,
we think that to respond to objects’ affordances we take into
account the context and the relationships between objects: for
example, a cup affords a different action when located near
to a coffeepot (we might need to hold it firmly to pour the
coffee), near to a spoon (we might need to hold its handle
to turn the spoon) or near to an object we want to hide (we
might want to turn it upside down). In all these cases, we
need to consider the relationship between the objects in the
context.
3. As to the relationship between apraxia and affordances, we
think, differently from Osiurak, that the possibility that apraxia
depends on difficulty in affordances processing is an interesting
research avenue that should be explored. For example, disturbed
object use and disturbed pantomime in apraxia (Goldenberg,
2009) can be linked to difficulties in responding properly to
affordances. In cases of disturbed object use patients typically
grasp the object in a wrong way and use it for a wrong purpose:
for example, they may grasp a hammer and move it to and fro
over the table. In cases of disturbed pantomime the patients
either perform the wrong movement or use a body part as object.
For example, a patient with disturbed ability to pantomime,
when asked to show how to use a comb will scratch his head.
Especially interesting are body part as object errors. Here the
patient, when asked to use scissors, will move his fingers as
it were scissors instead to show that he/she is holding scissors
and using them.The fact that such disturbances in object use
do not always lead to impairments in object recognition can be
explained by the fact that in our view not only object use, but also
object manipulation when directed to use can implicitly activate
object knowledge (see also Ellis and Tucker, 2000, for a similar
view).
4. Finally, with respect to Osiurak we do more clearly
differentiate between affordances (i.e., interactions between hand
and object) and action goal.
In line with some influential proposals on action
representation, such as those derived from ideomotor views
(e.g., Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001), empirical evidence has
shown that during action planning the action goal dominates
over the hand grip (e.g., van Elk et al., 2011). According to
hierarchical views of action representation (e.g., Grafton and
Hamilton, 2007), specific motor programs are selected on the
basis of the outcome of the action (see however Bonini et al.,
2012). We are totally in line with this view. On similar basis, we
agree with Osiurak as he highlights that the context and the goal
select affordances in a variable and flexible way. But once this
has happened, the selected affordances for a given context might
be stable.
To clarify with an example: neural and behavioral studies
have shown that the way in which we grasp objects might
differ depending on the context/goal, and that we are sensitive
to this information when we observe others. Fogassi et al.
(2005) have shown in a study on the monkey parietal cortex
that motor acts, such as ‘‘grasping’’, are coded differently
depending on the action goal (e.g., ‘‘grasping for eating’’
vs. ‘‘grasping for placing’’) (see also Iacoboni et al., 2005,
for an fMRI study on humans). In a similar vein, recent
kinematics evidence by Scorolli et al. (2014) demonstrated that
subtle variations in the hand posture can suggest whether an
individual vs. a cooperative action will be performed (e.g.,
grasp a cup of tea to drink/to offer it to someone else). The
context and the action goal are therefore not independent
from affordances. But some aspects remain rather stable: for
example, during both grasping for eating and grasping for
placing a cherry we use a precision grip, even if the grip
orientation and the action preparation vary depending on the
action goal.
In sum: we do not intend to deny the flexible interplay
between stable and variable aspects that occurs both when we
interact with objects and when we process images or words
referring to objects. This interplay might however be different
depending on whether affordances are processed online, during
direct interaction with objects, or whether they are processed
through images and words. In the first case stable affordances
might play a more marginal role compared to the second.
In particular, we propose that language understanding is tied
to and constrained by object affordances, but that language
recruits primarily some kinds of affordances, i.e., stable and
canonical affordances rather than variable ones (Borghi and
Riggio, 2009; Borghi, 2012). As we have seen, evidence from our
labs and other labs clearly supports this view.
Affordances Automaticity Questioned
As discussed above, the notion of affordances has been object
of growing interest in the last years, in particular in the
framework of embodied and grounded theories of cognition.
A variety of studies have been conducted, the majority of
which using compatibility effects. For example, in one of their
seminal studies Tucker and Ellis (1998) asked participants to
decide by pressing with the two hands two different keys
on the keyboard to decide whether objects were upright or
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reversed. Results showed a compatibility effect between the
location of the handle of the object (left, right) and that
of the key to press (left, right). The results suggest that
handles evoke affordances, even if the task does not require
to pay attention to them. Evidence like this has been taken
as demonstration that observing objects activate affordances,
and that affordances are activated automatically, independently
from the task at hand (for similar evidence, see Tucker and
Ellis, 2001). However, recent evidence suggests more caution in
approaching the issue of whether affordances are automatically
activated or not; the issue of automaticity contrasted with top-
down processing does not seem to be solved but is rather
hotly debated (see Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010; for a recent
critical review, see van Elk et al., 2014). First of all, some
recent work (Yu et al., 2014) failed to replicate compatibility
effects when participants were not explicitly instructed to
imagine picking up the pictured objects. More crucially, recent
studies have challenged the view according to which affordances
are automatically activated, showing that their activation is
modulated by the task and the context (e.g., Girardi et al.,
2010).
Some results by Riggio et al. (2008) are useful to understand
whether affordance effects can be qualified as automatic. The
authors presented participants with pictures of two objects
with a handle; one object remained on the screen and the
other disappeared. They used a modified version of Tucker
and Ellis (1998) task, asking half of the participants to judge
whether the object that disappeared and the other half to decide
whether the object that remained on the screen were upright
or reversed. Since disappearing stimuli are dynamic events
capturing attention, the target object could or could not be
the event capturing attention. The objects were shown above
and below or to the left and to the right of a fixation point
in order to dissociate the affordance effect (correspondence
between handle left-right orientation and response location)
and the Simon effect (correspondence between stimulus and
response position). The results showed that, while the Simon
effect occurred relative to the event capturing attention, the
affordance effect, when evident, was always relative to the target
object, irrespective of its attentional capturing properties. This
result is in keeping with the view that the affordance effect is
the consequence of encoding the pragmatic properties of the
target, and rules out the possibility that the effect is generated
by the attentional capture of the object (or part of it) per se.
Moreover, these findings suggest that automatic and controlled
processes of visual attention may play a differential role in the
occurrence of the affordance and Simon effects. In particular,
the affordance effect seems to depend on the selection and
processing of the objects that are relevant to the task. This
finding raises the issue of the automaticity of the activation of
affordances, even if the result is not necessarily incompatible
with an initial automatic activation of affordances followed
by the selection of the affordances relevant to their current
task.
Further recent studies, which we will briefly overview below
have shown that affordances activation is not independent from
the task and is modulated by the context.
Automatic but Task and Context Dependent
Task
A first series of studies has shown that affordances effects are
present only when the task requires deep processing of the objects
characteristics: for example, shape categorization typically leads
to affordance effects, while color categorization does not. To
the best of our knowledge, Tipper et al. (2006) were the first
who showed that the affordance effect was modulated by the
task, since it was present only when participants were required
to categorize handles as to their shape, not to their color. In
keeping with this result, Pellicano et al. (2010) used torches
and demonstrated that when categorizing them on the basis
of color (blue vs. red), a Simon effect (compatibility between
the goal-directed tip of the object and the location of the key
to press to respond) was found, but no affordance effect was
present. The affordance effect, intended as the compatibility
between the position of the object handle (left, right) and
the location of the key to press (left, right), was present only
when participants had to decide whether a given torch was
upright or reversed. Crucially, the effect was more marked
when the torches were switched on, in line with the idea
that participants formed a motor simulation of the action of
grasping the handle and holding the torch to illuminate. The
absence of the affordance effect with a color judgment task,
likely due to the fact that color categorization requires superficial
processing, challenges the view according to which affordances
are activated automatically, i.e., independently from the task at
hand (for a computational model on this, see Simione et al.,
submitted).
Context
A further series of studies has started to emphasize the
importance of context in responding to affordances.
Single objects: near and far space
Recent studies demonstrated that object affordances are only
activated when objects are located in the near (peripersonal)
but not in the far (extrapersonal) space. Costantini et al.
(2010) showed with 3D pictures of everyday objects (e.g., bottle,
cup) that objects evoke actions only when they are presented
within the portion of the near space that is reachable by the
participants.
Further studies with a similar paradigm investigated whether
the modulation of the affordance effects due to their location
in the near and far space held also with linguistic stimuli.
Costantini et al. (2011a) showed participants with 3D objects
located in peripersonal vs. extrapersonal space followed by
function, manipulation or observation verbs (e.g., ‘‘to drink’’,
‘‘to grasp’’, ‘‘to look at’’). Participants were required to respond
releasing a key and performing a simulated grasp when the verb
they read was compatible with the presented object. Responses
with both function and manipulation verbs were faster when
objects were presented in reachable than in the far space, while
no difference between the near and far space was present for
observation verbs. Results suggest that, during simulation of
an action evoked by manipulation and function verbs, objects
affordances are primarily activated when objects appear in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 8 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 351
Borghi and Riggio Kinds of affordances, flexibility and context
the participants’ reachable and operational space. Ambrosini
et al. (2012) confirmed and extended the previous finding.
They used the same paradigm, but introduced a variation:
they distinguished between actual and perceived (explicitly
estimated by participants) near and far space. Their results
confirmed that responses to verbs related to actions were
faster in the near than in the far space, while responses to
pointing and observation verbs did not differ. Importantly,
responses to function and manipulation verbs were faster in
the actual near space compared to the perceived near space.
This finding suggests that activation of affordances when
objects were followed by action verbs is modulated by objects’
location in space with respect to the body. Importantly, this
location is computed online and it is not reflected in explicit
representations, as the distance estimations participants were
required to provide. It should be noted that these results are
quite in agreement with the neural counterpart of affordances
computation. As already said the AIP-F5 and ventral intraparietal
area (VIP)-F4 circuits are interconnected. In particular the VIP-
F4 circuit codes the peripersonal space, that coincides with the
motor space for arm reaching, regardless of the eye location,
thus explaning why the space modulation is limited to action
verbs.
One possible question that might rise is the following: given
that according to your proposal language encodes stable and
(eventually) canonical affordances, but not variable ones, why
did you find that variable affordances as those emerging from
object’s location and orientation with respect to our own body
influence language processing? Notice that the present study does
not make use of solely linguistic stimuli, but of linguistic stimuli
in combination with pictures—this is likely the reason why action
verbs encoded variable affordances as well (see below).
Even if the effect was present with action verbs, it disappeared
when object names were presented. Ferri et al. (2011b) used
a similar but sligthly different paradigm, in which participants
after presentation of the 3D images had to decide by making
a reach-to-power or a reach-to-precision response whether the
object was congruent with a previously displayed word. They
found a compatibility effect between the response and the grip
evoked by the object, but, differently from what happened
with objects, the effect was not limited within the reaching
space. However an important difference exists between the two
studies. Costantini et al. (2011a) and Ambrosini et al. (2012) first
presented visual objects and then verbs: as already said, in these
cases object perception recruits motor information related to
their possible interaction only when objects are presented in the
near space, determining a priming effect when verbs expressing
such an interaction are then presented. Ferri et al. (2011b),
conversely, first presented nouns and then visual objects. Results
demonstrated that noun processing recruits motor information
too, but in this case the motor recruitment is not limited to
objects that are then presented in the near space since noun
processing cannot specify variables features such as the distance
between the object denoted by the noun and the body. Indeed
when a noun is presented the VIP-F4 circuit cannot be activated
since a physical object is absent. However the size-grasp motor
recruitment is still present even if it is not modulated by the
space; stressing, in line with embodied theories, that concepts
incorporate motor information.
Overall, the studies presented reveal that: (a) affordance
activation is modulated by the distance of the object from the
body; (b) that this information is encoded in language only to a
certain extent, probably due to the fact that the object location is a
variable affordance. Further studies with solely linguistic stimuli
are probably necessary to better understand how different kinds
of affordances are linguistically encoded.
Single objects in scene, or more than one object
For a while the majority of studies on affordances have focused
on how we respond to single affordances, and to single objects. It
is however important to focus also on objects that might evoke
different affordances. In everyday life we are indeed typically
exposed tomultiple affordances. Many objects typically surround
us—for example, I might choose to write with the laptop or
with a pen I have on my desk. Even the same object can
evoke multiple affordances: for example, different parts of an
ice cream might evoke grasping and licking. While grasping
and licking can be performed at the same time, sometimes
objects evoke conflicting actions: for example, a sofa might
invite us to sit but also to jump on it, or the same object
can elicit different kind of grips. Studies mostly performed in
Laurel Buxbaum’s lab have shown that structural information
and functional information may conflict while planning actions
with objects. Interestingly, these two kinds of information
have a different time course: functional information may last
longer generating long-term interference, as information in
long term memory, while structural information has a rapid
decay (Jax and Buxbaum, 2010). Recent work by Kalénine
et al. (2014) demonstrated that, depending on the kind of
scene in which it is embedded, the same object can evoke a
manipulative or a functional grip. They presented images of
‘‘conflict’’ objects, i.e., objects associated with move (clench
posture) vs. use (pinch posture) hand postures, as for example
a corkscrew. The objects were displayed within everyday scenes,
as a kitchen or an office. The results revealed a compatibility
effect between the move scene (e.g., drawer for corkscrew) and
the clench posture and a more marked compatibility effect
between the use scene (e.g., on a bottle for corkscrew) and the
pinch response. This result suggests that the same object can
evoke different affordances depending on the context. However,
the time-course of the process needs to be explored, since
the result is compatible with two possibilities: an automatic
activation of all object affordances followed by a selection,
triggered by the context, of the affordance relevant for the
current context, or an early selection determined by the
context.
As we have seen, the same object can evoke different
affordances, and the context selects which one to activate.
Apart from this, objects might be embedded in contexts where
multiple objects are present, hence where multiple affordances
are activated. Pezzulo et al. (2010) analyzed how expert and
novice climbers memorizemultiple affordances, i.e., sequences of
holds organized in routes of varying difficulty. They found that
climbers simulated ascending the route: thus they represented
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affordances in context, and this influenced their recall. Aside
from this study, the great part of evidence concerns online
processing of objects or images rather than recall tasks. To
our knowledge the only notable exception are the studies
recently conducted by Diane Pecher and collaborators, who
investigated the role played by affordances in working memory
using interfering paradigm (e.g., Pecher, 2013). The authors
failed to find that affordances played a role in working memory.
This could be due to the fact that, in order to be activated,
affordances linked to memory would need deeper processing
compared to the more superficial one required by working
memory. This is in line with our view, according to which stable
and canonical affordances are encoded in long-term memory,
while temporary affordances decay rather soon. Their rapid
decay can contribute in explaining why variable affordances
require continuous monitoring of the relationship between the
hand and the object.
So far we used the term ‘‘context’’ referring only to the
physical context (e.g., scenes, presence of other objects, etc.). It
is however important to determine the influence on affordance
activation of both the physical and the social context. To
investigate this, some authors have introduced the presence of
social cues, for example of an effector interacting or potentially
interacting with the object, or of a more complex social context.
Physical and social context
Yoon et al. (2010) have demonstrated affordances effects
presenting participants with object pairs. Right-handed
participants made faster classification responses to pairs of
objects displayed in standard co-locations for right-handed
actions compared to when the objects are shown in reflected
locations. These effects were more marked when participants’
task consisted in deciding if the two objects are typically
used together, rather than if objects typically occur in a
given context. The effects, which are stronger when an agent
is shown holding the objects, disappear when the objects
are not viewed from the first-person perspective and when
words are presented rather than objects. The data suggest
that: (a) participants are sensitive to whether objects are
positioned correctly for their own actions; (b) the position
information is coded within an egocentric reference frame; (c)
the critical representation involved is visual and not semantic;
and (d) the effects are enhanced by a sense of agency. The
authors interpret the results within a dual-route framework
for action retrieval in which a direct visual route, the dorsal
one, is influenced by affordances for action, while the ventral
route is not. If we consider the further distinction between
the dorso-dorso and ventro-dorsal stream, however, we
could hypothesize that the process pertains the dorso-dorsal
route.
Borghi et al. (2012) presented images of pairs of objects
linked by different kinds of relations. They could be functionally
related (e.g., scissors-paper) (functional context), thematically
related (e.g., scissors, stapler) (spatial context) or not related (e.g.,
scissors-bottle). The object to be used was positioned on the
right. In 34 of the trials a hand appeared, which could be simply
close to the object, or interacting with it either with a functional
grip, i.e., grasping the object as to use it, or a manipulative grip.
Participants were required to decide by pressing a different key
on the keyboard whether the two objects were related or not. The
results showed a clear effect of the context. Overall, the functional
context was processed faster than the spatial one, consistently
with the view that artifacts are represented in terms of their
use. Most importantly, the interaction between the hand posture
and the context was significant. A compatibility effect between
context and grip was found: response times were indeed slower
when a manipulative grip was presented in a functional context,
and when a functional hand posture was displayed in a Spatial
context.
The neural mechanisms underlying the described interaction
were further investigated by an EEG study with the same stimuli
(Natraj et al., 2013). While both Functional and Manipulative
postures in the Functional context activated predominantly
an early left parietofrontal circuit, the Manipulative posture
alone engaged a late right parietofrontal network. Furthermore,
bilateral parietofrontal activation increases with the Spatial
context, supporting our previous interpretation that, when no
functional use of the object is allowed, the motor system tries
to make sense of the scene. These EEG results suggest that,
when action affordances are not immediately apparent and hand
posture does not support action (Manipulative) as well as when
the context does not immediately evoke tool use (Spatial context),
bilateral activation is increased.
Overall, the two previously described studies highlight the
relevance for affordance activation of both the physical context
(relations between objects) and of the social cues allowing to
detect the intention of the agent, given by the different hand
postures. A number of recent studies focus on affordances
in a social context (e.g., Sartori et al., 2009; Ferri et al.,
2011a; Ellis et al., 2013). We will here illustrate a recent
kinematics study by Scorolli et al. (2014) who investigated
the role of the physical and social context more in depth,
engaging participants in an interaction with real objects and
with a real other person (the experimenter). Real objects were
presented, which could be linked, as in the previous studies, by
no relation, by Spatial relations (e.g., cup-knife) or by Functional
relations. The Functional relations could be of two different
kinds, i.e., functional-individual or functional-cooperative. With
functional-individual relations the two objects are typically used
together to perform an individual action (e.g., I typically put
the teabag in my own cup), while with Functional-cooperative
relations (e.g., cup-teapot) the two objects are used to perform
an action that can typically involve somebody else: for example,
I typically pour the tea from the tea-pot in the cup of
somebody else. Further manipulation of the social intention
of the experimenter were introduced: to move the objects the
experimenter used either a functional grip or a manipulative
grip (e.g., grasping the cup to drink from it or to put it away),
and he could observe or not the other (direct vs. indirect gaze).
The participants were submitted to two different conditions: in
the give condition they had to move the target object toward
the experimenter, while in the get condition they moved it
toward themselves. The analysis of the kinematic parameters
revealed that, during the give condition, the wrist acceleration
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peak was reached earlier when the other used a functional
posture, and the maximal fingers aperture was reached faster
when the objects were linked by functional individual than by
functional cooperative relations. In the get condition, during
visual contact the maximal fingers aperture increased when
the experimenter has executed a manipulative grip, as if the
participant felt entitled to take the object. This reveals that
participants are highly sensitive to cues that might lead to a social
or cooperative action. These cues can be found in the relations
between objects as well in the characteristics of others that can
be indicative of a social intention, such as the gaze and even the
hand posture—participants seem indeed to interpret the direct
gaze and manipulative grip as leading to a social action.
Avoiding to Respond to Affordances
Affordances allow us to respond adequately to objects: objects
invite us to perform actions with them, in order to reach
our goals. However, there might be cases in which, instead of
responding to affordances, we may need to avoid responding to
the ‘‘invitations’’ we have received.
We will outline a series of cases, which may differ in intensity
and specificity, in which such a situation might occur.
Multiple Affordances
We have addressed the issue of multiple affordances in the
previous session. As we have seen, the studies focusing on
multiple affordances are not many, since most of recent
experimental work has focused on the interaction with single
objects. There are some studies on affordance effects elicited by
different parts of the same object (Riggio et al., 2006; Borghi
and Riggio, 2009; Pellicano et al., 2010), as well as studies
on objects evoking conflicting actions (e.g., Jax and Buxbaum,
2010; Kalénine et al., 2014). Furthermore, some studies present
participants with pairs of objects, the affordances of which can be
combined to obtain an aim, as for example scissors and papers
(Humphreys et al., 2010; Borghi et al., 2012; Natraj et al., 2013;
Scorolli et al., 2014), and studies on multiple objects of the same
kind (Pezzulo et al., 2010).
Our overall impression is that research so far has not
clarified what happens when multiple affordances are activated.
It is currently still unclear, whether we activate all possible
affordances, or not. There are some possible scenarios: (a) all
affordances are automatically activated, and some of them decay,
because they are not selected as they are not relevant to the
current context/situation and to the current goals of the observer;
(b) all affordances are automatically activated, and some of them
are actively inhibited to avoid interference between them, since
not relevant to the current context and goal; (c) only the single
affordance or the subset of affordances relevant to the current
context/situation and to our present goals are activated. In the
last case the context and the goals would work as an early
filter. Both (a) and (b) are in keeping with the influential neural
model of action selection described by Cisek (2007). In Cisek’s
model, the different objects activate multiple afforded actions
automatically, with a later stage of competition in which only one
of these actions is selected to be executed.
Broken Affordances
A different case is when objects present affordances but they
cannot be used, for example because they are broken. It is
possible that, in this case, the mechanism is different, i.e., that
the affordance is activated but then actively inhibited. In a recent
TMS study Buccino et al. (2009) stimulated the left hemisphere
hand motor area of participants who observed everyday objects,
centrally presented, with a complete or broken handle, positioned
to the right or to the left. Results revealed that the Motor Evoked
Potential area was larger when the handle was on the right
side of the object, but only when the handle was complete.
The absence of a difference between right and left when the
handle was broken is compatible with the absence of affordance
activation when the pragmatic conditions to perform an action
are not met. These data suggest that the handle affordances are
not activated or that they are activated and then inhibited when
the handle is broken, leading to a reduction of activation in the
cortical areas typically involved in performing action when the
handle is intact. The possibility to inhibit affordances was, for
example, shown by Riggio et al. (2006) using an inhibition of
return (IOR) paradigm. They presented first whole objects, in
which the distinction between the graspable and the ungraspable
parts was clearly defined (for instance, in a knife, although we
can distinguish between blade and handle, only the handle is used
for grasping the object), and then graspable or ungraspable parts
of the objects. Participants had to ignore whole objects and to
respond to objects parts. Results showed greater inhibitory effects
for graspable than for ungraspable parts, specific for the most
appropriate action necessary to grasp a specific object. Therefore
results suggest distinct inhibitory effects related to the pragmatic
features of objects, possibly activated by the neural substrates
responsible for sensorimotor transformations required to act
properly on an object. If this is the case, the mechanism active
with broken affordances would be rather similar to what happens
when processing negative action sentences (Tettamanti et al.,
2008): the areas typically involved in action representation are
recruited and then actively inhibited. A less probable alternative
interpretation of the results is that affordances related to the
broken handle are inhibited from the very start, hence not
activated at all. This would be a case in which the context works as
an early filter. Further studies on the time course of the process
are necessary to better understand the mechanisms underlying
broken affordances activation.
Dangerous Objects
A special case is represented by dangerous objects. As in the
case of broken affordances, with dangerous objects it is possible
that we activate affordances, and then actively inhibit them, or
alternatively that we directly avoid to activate them. We will
illustrate and discuss below some recent studies we performed
in which we contrasted neutral and dangerous objects.
In a first series of studies we presented images of graspable
or of dangerous objects, preceded by a hand (a male hand, a
female hand and a robotic grasping-hand; a male and a female
static-hand) or by a control object, and asked participants to
categorize target-objects into artifacts and natural objects by
pressing two different keys on the keyboard. Across different
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experiments, performed with children and adults, we found that
response times with dangerous objects were slower compared to
those with neutral objects. Let us call this phenomenon a form of
inhibition; we will discuss it later in more details. Interestingly,
this inhibition was modulated by the hand prime. In a first
study with children, we found that the inhibition effect was more
marked when the perceived vulnerability of the hand was higher:
female hands induced the strongest inhibition, followed by male
hands, while robotic hands elicited the lowest one (Anelli et al.,
2012); moreover, analyses indicated an effect of motor resonance:
the more children and adults perceived the hand as similar to
their own hand, the higher was the inhibition. The results of these
studies, however, do not allow us to fully disentangle the effects of
affordances from the effects of the prime. In addition, it remains
unclear whether the slower reactions times (RTs) associated
to dangerous objects are due to a late occurring blocking
mechanism or the presence of aversive affordances, i.e., to the
fact that dangerous objects are perceived as such from the start.
Further studies with different paradigms were performed
to better understand the mechanisms underlying affordance
activation, deactivation or not activation, in case of dangerous
objects. We used a line bisection task (Anelli et al., 2013b).
This paradigm is interesting because it allowed us to observe
sensitivity to dangerous stimuli with a task not requiring stimulus
response compatibility and where the object stimuli did not
need to be processed to perform the task (Ohman et al., 2001);
furthermore, compared to the above illustrated studies, the object
was presented without a hand in potential interaction with it,
thus it was easier to capture the effect of the object on its own.
In a first study a line was flanked by neutral graspable and by
dangerous objects of similar size (e.g., bulb vs. broken bulb;
spoon vs. knife; cat vs. porcupine); we found that adolescents
and adults tended to misperceive the line midpoint away from
the dangerous objects. To understand whether the result was due
to an affordance effect (the tendency to approach the graspable
object) or to an avoidance effect (the tendency to refrain from
the dangerous one) we asked adults to bisect lines flanked by
dangerous and neutral objects matched on graspability (both
graspable or ungraspable). The results indicate that graspable
dangerous objects evoke aversive affordances characterized by
themotor tendency to step back and escape. Time course analyses
would be necessary to capture precisely how the process unfolds
in time.
In a further study (Anelli et al., 2013a) we presented
participants, children and adults, with artifact and natural
objects, both neutral and dangerous, and asked them to
categorize the objects, either by pressing or by releasing two
different keys on the keyboard. The critical manipulation
consisted in presenting the objects as moving away or toward
the participant. Results were rather straightforward: neutral
objects responded to faster when they performed an approaching
movement, while dangerous objects when theymoved away from
the participant. No effect of the response typology was present.
To better understand the time course of the process we
presented static images of the objects, which were displayed
in different sizes (large-medium-small size), as if closer or
further away from participants. In Experiment 2, 1 s passed
between the presentation of a first image and the displacement
of the second, that could be larger, smaller or of the same
size, and that represented the go signal; in Experiment 3 the
second image was immediately following the first one. The
results can be interpreted relying on the different timing of
the two experiments: when participants had time to prepare
their response (i.e., 1 s passed before the presentation of the go
signal) they responded immediately, faster, to larger objects, the
most dangerous ones. When they did not have time to prepare
themselves, instead, response times were longer, in particular
with larger objects. We interpreted this result as due to a sort of
freezing effect (see Eder et al., 2014), which was larger the bigger,
hence more dangerous were the stimuli.
Overall, all these studies reveal that we are sensitive to
dangerous affordances. We respond faster to them when objects
or entities with dangerous affordancesmove toward us. Similarly,
we tend to avoid graspable objects with dangerous affordances,
as evidence on line bisection reveals. This evidence is in keeping
with studies on approach avoidance effects, which show that we
tend to attract positively connoted words and to withdraw from
negative ones (Chen and Bargh, 1999; van Dantzig et al., 2008;
Freina et al., 2009).
As to response times, across the experiments and populations
(children, adolescents, adults) we found that responses to
dangerous objects are slower than responses to affordances of
neutral objects. Further results in the literature are consistent
with our findings. Studies on the emotional Stroop effect have
shown a general RTs slowdown with aversive stimuli (e.g.,
Algom et al., 2004). Algom et al. (2004) have proposed that the
threatening character of stimuli determines a generic slowdown
of responses.
The longer RTs we found with dangerous stimuli can
be explained in terms of the mechanisms highlighted by
Caligiore et al. (2013) in their TRoPICAL model (see also
Caligiore et al., 2010). The model explains negative compatibility
effects occurring when participants are required to respond to
target-objects while refraining from responding to distractors.
According to the model the dorsal and ventral pathways process
information related to both the target-object and the distractor.
Caligiore et al. (2013) have shown that the prefrontal cortex
(PFC) plays a double role, exerting both an inhibitory and an
excitatory control (Munakata et al., 2011). In Caligiore et al.
(2013), this inhibitory control allows the model to refrain from
executing the actions suggested by the distractors; similarly, since
PFC can receive inputs from the emotional circuits, it may allow
participants to inhibit the tendency to respond to affordances of
dangerous objects.
In terms of time course, the slower responses with dangerous
objects could be due to two different processes: (a) A two-stages
process: we would perceive objects affordances, and plan our
actions as a consequence of this; then we would realize that the
objects are dangerous and block the planned responses; (b) A
more automatic process: we would immediately perceive aversive
affordances as such, and we would inhibit any motor response,
adopting a freezing behavior. This outcome would occur in
particular when dangerous objects are very close to us and we
have no time to prepare an exit strategy.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 351
Borghi and Riggio Kinds of affordances, flexibility and context
Our data speak in favor of the second hypothesis. At the same
time, they reveal that our responses to objects are highly flexible
and dependent on the spatial context (near vs. far space), and on
the presentation modality of the stimuli, dynamic vs. static (with
dynamic objects no effect of the motor response—key press vs.
key release—was found, while with static objects clear differences
between the two motor responses were observed).
In sum: we have outlined three cases in which we might
activate affordances, and then need to suppress them: the cases
of multiple affordances, of broken affordances and of dangerous
objects. As to multiple affordances, further evidence is needed to
understand whether all affordances are automatically activated
or whether only affordances relevant to the current context
and situation are selected. What is certain is that an increasing
number of studies are showing the importance of context for
affordances activation. In the case of broken affordances, some
of our results suggest that it is possible that the observer actively
inhibits the activated affordances or that the affordances are not
activated. As to dangerous objects, our results suggest that we do
not activate their affordances and then block them, but that we
respond directly to aversive affordances.
Conclusion
Affordances represent an important aspect of our physical
and social environment. Our interaction with the surrounding
environment is namely potentiated and constrained by them. It is
therefore particularly important to understand the mechanisms
underlying their activation.
In the first part of the paper we have proposed that
two different kinds of affordances exist: stable and variable
affordances. As to their brain representation, these two kinds
of affordances activate overlapping areas within the dorsal
stream but have also different neural underpinnings, since
the first activate mainly the dorso-ventral stream, while the
second engage primarily the dorso-dorsal one (Sakreida et al.,
in preparation). We have seen that our proposal is related
to Jeannerod’s distinction between intrinsic and intrinsic
properties, and that it is strictly linked, but not correspondent,
with the view that there might be affordances dedicated to object
manipulation and others to object use. Both variable and stable
affordances are flexible, even if to a different extent. When it
comes to language, we propose that language incorporates only
certain kinds of affordances, i.e., stable and canonical rather than
variable ones (see Borghi, 2012, for an extensive discussion of this
issue). Current evidence obtained in our and other labs supports
this view (Borghi and Riggio, 2009; Ferri et al., 2011b;Myachykov
et al., 2013; Flumini et al., 2014).
In the second part of the paper we have shown that recent
evidence on contextual dependence of affordances may challenge
the idea that they are automatically activated. We have briefly
reviewed studies showing that the activation of affordances is
modulated by the task (superficial vs. deep processing, as in color
vs. shape categorization) and by the physical and social context,
i.e., by the distance of objects from the body, by the relations
between objects, by the scenes in which they are embedded, by
the presence of others and by the intentions of others we infer
from their behavior.
As we have seen, the data on conceptual dependence are not
incompatible with the view that affordances are automatically
activated, provided that the selection of the relevant affordances
occurs late.
The two parts of this paper, the first concerning kinds of
affordances and the second concerning their automaticity, might
seem separate and independent, because focused on different
aspects. However, we think they are deeply interconnected.
The distinction between stable and variable affordances can
indeed provide new ways to think of affordances automaticity,
and can help advancing new predictions. It is indeed possible
that all affordances are automatically activated, and that a
competition among them is differently solved depending on
the task and the stimuli. We can hypothesize that, when
the task and the stimuli are linguistic, functional information
‘‘wins’’ over manipulation, unless the linguistic context clearly
primes manipulation (see Lee et al., 2013, for a study
highlighting the role of the linguistic context). Similarly, stable
affordandes would ‘‘win’’ over variable ones. When the stimuli
are not linguistic but consist of real objects and the task
involves interaction with them the advantage of stable over
variable affordances would disappear. As far as affordances
related to manipulation and function are concerned, instead,
the competition will be solved differently depending on the
context.
In all cases, further evidence on the time course of these
processes is needed. In addition, computational models of these
processes would be really helpful in providing a synthetic
framework and in refining predictions (for current models, see
Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010; Caligiore et al., 2010).
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